From another direction, the strength of the Boko Haram insurgents may be explained through the concept of cosmic war which concerns periods of suffering, injustice, and trials in which the truly faithful will prevail. This period of trial and suffering is not the end but rather navigates a path to a new era of justice when things are put in a proper shape. Cosmic war normally invites individuals to participate in something greater than themselves and to give their lives to the ultimate cause. There are two ways out of a cosmic war namely total victory or defeat, or “redirecting the theology by offering interpretations of the faith that contradict the apolcalyptic imaginings of cosmic war and its need for violence”.
However, this explanation offers indications that the factors that potentially work against the interest of militant groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS may be favourable to the goals of Boko Haram Movement in Nigeria, because, Total victory…is difficult to realise given that militant Islamic movements that aim to establish or reestablish the faith in social and political realms do not operate on a unified front; there are Shi’a and Sunni groups fighting for these goals such as the Lebanese Shi’a Hizbullah and Sunni Al-Qaeda. However, Sunnis and Shi’as have different understandings of what political and religious leadership should look like. Moreover, within these sects there are groups that are fighting for different goals, such as the Sunni Hamas, which has Islamic and nationalistic goals for Palestine, and Al-Qaeda, which has pan-Islamic, post-nationalistic goals. In other words, these movements’ concepts of “total victory” are not unified in practice.
The above is untrue of the Boko Haram Movement.
Wander-lust for revivalism thesis is another considerable explanation with potential to expose the essence of the Boko Haram operations. This may be situated, to an extent, into the redirection of theology argument, advanced earlier in this discourse. The term, jihad, which literally means struggle or strive, is at the centre of it all. Most Muslims are able to distinguish between the greater jihad which implies a spiritual struggle to overcome temptations and live a pious life, and the lesser jihad which is the physical struggle in defence of the faith which involves the use of force. However, militant Islamists like Al-Qaeda, and now Boko Haram, emphasise the lesser jihad but there is a room to challenge their interpretation and reemphasise the priority of the greater jihad. This is where there is another challenge to Nigeria in her counter-terrorist drive.
It should be underscored that it was the September 11, 2011 experience that prompted the United States to pay attention to the age-long portrayal of Islam as under attack and the call on Muslims to rise and defend their religion with their lives. It should equally be underscored that the contemporary leaders of militant Islamic movements like Shaykh Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al-Zawahiri were not the originators of this line of interpreting Islam. Rather, their ideology has its roots in the writings of mid-20th century Muslim revivalists like Hassan Al-Banna of Egypt, Abu Ala’la Al-Mawdudi of South Asia, Sayyid Qutb of Egypt and Abd al-Salam al-Faraj also of Egypt.
These individuals enjoined Muslims to disregard alien ideologies and embrace Islam as a total way of life, socially, spiritually, politically, and economically. These activists describe Islamic societies as being in a state of crisis caused by the penetration of Western, secular ideologies – particularly capitalism and Marxism – and the failure of Muslim political and religious leadership to direct society in the right path of Islam…the path of Islam requires Muslim societies and their leaders to return to Islam, and look within their faith for the template to live a rightly guided life as individuals, societies, and nations. In the Nigerian context, this may not necessarily mean the need for the enthronement of Shari’ah at all levels and strata. It may just simply mean justice and equity.
It is instructive to point out that although al-Banna is regarded by most scholars as the founder of modern-day Islamic revivalism of which militant Islam is an offshoot, his vision for redirecting the Egyptian society to the right Islamic path was not built on violence but the concept of grassroots revival that would, in turn, transform society and eventually the government. (p. 191).
However, Mawdudi, who in his own struggle, also argued that Muslim society was under threat and had become an appendage of the West, emphasised that the only way out was to restore its strength by returning to Islam.
Consequently, Qutb derived inspirations from the works of both Al-Banna and Al-Mawdudi. Qutb did not hide his disdain for the dominance of the secular ideologies of Capitalism and Communism and thought it appropriate to navigating way for the enthronement of an Islamic ideology “that would not only replace the secular ideologies of Capitalism and Communism, but would surpass their moral bankruptcy and provide a true and complete way of life. It was pursuant to the realisation of their dream and vision that the Muslim Brotherhood collaborated with Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers Movement to overthrow the king and enthrone a republic in Egypt.
Qutb and other members of the Muslim Brotherhood saw that development as signalling the time for the pursuit of the revivalist ideology using the machinery of the government but did not find a cooperative ally in Nasr who rejected their idea. Today, the Al-Qaeda ideology appears as a kind of replication of the arguments pursued by Banna, Mawdudi, Qutb, and Faraj.
However, given that the essence of alluding to these various groups in this discourse is merely to expose the interplay of various variables in Boko Haram insurgency, specific details of the core principles and ideological orientations guiding the Boko Haram thought and operations in Nigeria and its environs, shall be a subject of another article.
There appears to be lack of rigour in some of Nigeria’s actions against the insurgents given the media inaccuracies or other forms of inexactitude that informed such actions. Given the government’s actions, in several notable instances, based on conflicting information, the false or multiple claims of responsibility for attacks, and official censorship and disinformation, it shall be of great value for the Defence Headquarters to be more sensitive and meticulous in its handling of its various sources of information. This admonitory thinking by the writer is based on the inspiration derived from Oftedal who recently wrote that, “Boko Haram appears not to have issued any comprehensive ideological declaration stating its objectives and strategies.
A manifesto exists signed by Boko Haram, but most experts believe it is a falsification. However, the group has released several shorter statements in which they have claimed responsibility for attacks, issued threats or reacted to public criticisms from powerful Nigerian figures. The group’s …leader has released other statements in videos or audio-clips on YouTube. In addition, local and international media have been able to interview some of Boko Haram’s leaders. Several recordings of sermons by the founder Muhammed Yusuf are available on DVDs circulated in Nigeria, as well as on You Tube. These primary sources are important for identifying some of Boko Haram’s most central ideas and objectives.”
Several sectors have to collaborate with the Armed Forces if the Boko Haram defeat must materialise. Prominent among them are the media, the religious institutions, and most importantly, the education sector whose intervention may take the form of what I call “anti-insurgency curriculum conceptual and design principles for ultimate translation to an anti-extremist curriculum for Nigerian senior secondary schools.” But, do we really have an attentive government?
Concluded
Rufai (Ph.D Curriculum and Pedagogy, Ph.D History and Security Studies), is Ag. Dean, Faculty of Education, Sokoto State University
END
Be the first to comment