The central theme of Boko Haram’s message is that Islam is averse to Western secular education. In a similar token, the group maintains that evangelism, which is being deceitfully given the coloring of Western education, is Islamically unacceptable. It may be reiterated here that this particular anti-Western education stance cannot be regarded as an initiative of the Boko Haram leader, Muhammad Yusuf, given the fact that literature is replete with information concerning the apprehension of Northern Nigerian Islamic scholars who had been unrepentantly critical of Western education, which they saw as a potential instrument for possible conversion of their unsuspecting children and wards to Christianity. It may however be acknowledged for the records, albeit arguably, that this age-long practice was what Boko Haram exploited and deceitfully presented as the nucleus of its ideology.
As time progressed, illiterates and jobless youths flocked around Yusuf to embrace his doctrines. Some of the educated ones among his followers were said to have torn off their certificates in demonstration of their total commitment to the path of Yusuf. His claim was that their mission was to fight the satanic system and enthrone the Shari’ah in the country. However, the group was able to attract to itself few members of some of the most influential families in Maiduguri, such as Maikanti Indimi and Bana Mulima. According to Muhammad Murtada who wrote in 2010, it was Yusuf’s persistent attack on anything western that made him a hero and role model as he was believed to have been using his Islamic knowledge to justify his mission to his followers. Evidence abound in research that people are attracted to a movement owing to their subscription to such social forces with potential to stimulate a breakout in rebellion against the system as being experienced in the Boko Haram case.
As recently pointed out by Henry Borom, the unrepentant nature of Boko Haram Movement suggests the somewhat rewarding nature of the outcome of their recruitment strategy where established members are charged with the responsibility of recruiting others by seeking to identify those who are most likely to agree to act, if asked, and to further the cause. This way, the leadership of the sect charges its rational prospectors with the use of intelligence to find likely targets after which recruiters provide further information and deploy inducements to persuade recruits to say “yes”. This strategy which relies on social bonds and relationships, has been a source of strength to the sect, especially with regard to its ever-expanding recruitment networks. It will be an appreciable counter-terrorist strategy for the Presidency to investigate the specific attractions that have prompted recruits to continue to join the Boko Haram insurgents.
For instance, a top military officer who is regarded as having “deep knowledge of the North-East operations” against Boko Haram seemed to have exposed the deficient nature of the intelligence and counter-intelligence capacity of the Nigerian troops where he revealed (as published in Premium Times of November 7, 2016) that Boko Haram attacked the very night immediately after “one officer and 49 soldiers were withdrawn from Mallam Fatori in the morning and that suggests that they possibly had advance information of the troops reduction in number”. The military source confirmed that “Boko Haram seems to have good strategists who study our modus operandi and cause them to adjust accordingly. The Nigerian military may need to reappraise its approach to counter-insurgency operations”.
What the above revelation by a top military officer says directly is very clear. However, what it says indirectly is loaded and voluminous in the estimation of scholars of terrorism and counter-terrorism. For instance, Boko Haram’s capacity for advanced collection and sophisticated use of operational intelligence in a manner capable of wreaking havoc that will subsequently inflict mass casualties. It was the hybridised strategic intelligence of Boko Haram that influenced its operational decision to strike without delay. How the insurgents were able to access useful security reports on the federal troops and, at the same time, create a security umbrella that concealed the development and shielded the operation from exposure at any stage, is good operational intelligence! Their performance in this regard is analogous to a flight hijackers operational knowledge that the best time to storm the cockpit is 10 to 15 minutes after take-off by which time the cockpit is normally opened for the first time and an action or counteraction must not be a minute late!
Besides, despite the centrality of the role of identity in terrorism and radicalisation, as evident in literature, Nigerians cannot claim to really have any clue as to who is involved in Boko Haram strategising or any idea of how the insurgents see themselves. Such a strategic investigation has the potential to provide insights into the issue of religious identity of the membership of a religious extremist group in a pluralistic setting like Nigeria. Gaining access into details of what the sect has as group identity which may include shared experiences, attitudes, beliefs and interests of in-group members, may provide further insights into the possible ways of engaging with such a group which is allegedly committed to the achievement of a collectively professed aim to rid Nigeria of its corrupt and abusive government and institute religious purity. Nigerians will appreciate some updates on new discoveries by the Nigerian troops about Boko Haram as a way of assuring the citizenry that it is all under control. The security implications of such an undertaking are psychologically assuring rather than counter-productive.
Social scientists have proferred four explanations to the group identity question namely depersonalisation, social cohesion, conformity and obedience, as well as bipolar worldview. The depersonalisation dimension may be explained by the fact that the Boko Haram insurgents may see themselves as interchangeable members of an organisation and are therefore motivated to make uppermost in their hearts the interests and goals of the organisation. As regards the social cohesion dimension, it may be explained by the collective identity shared by members of the group as such identity binds them together and promotes positive relationships and the spirit of togetherness. The conformity and obedience factor concerns the need for an unrestricted identification with terrorist organisations through an unrestricted identification with the norms that guide the member’s behaviour.
Concerning bipolar worldview in connection with the insurgents, it is interesting to note that they nurse disdain against and develop negative feelings about people outside their group, as a result of the motivation they derive from their unrepentant identification with their group. The implication of this in the estimation of terrorists is that the world is divided between “us” and “them”. They see themselves as bastions of the values and interests of an ethnic or religious community. It is theoretically predictable that the self-identification of terrorists as members of a much larger community will help them to fulfil their avowed goals. This may be an explanation for the unrepentant nature of Boko Haram and a competently designed systematic national counter-ideological orientation that may prove efficacious in this regard.
The Boko Haram Movement is generally situated within the broad area of fundamentalism which scholars have identified as the most marginal of the dominant streams of Islamic thinking in contemporary Nigeria. They associate it with anti-system movements that express aversion to the established political authorities which are regarded as being grossly secular. These movements are not only opposed to the government but also to established religious elite whom they perceive as lethargic. According to David Chalk, “the fundamentalists cite the dysfunctional conditions of the secular Nigerian state as a reason to challenge current moral and political order through religion. Their aim is a society guided by the rules and principles of Islam, and they are willing to suffer, struggle and actively embrace martyrdom to achieve this end.
To be concluded
Rufai (Ph.D Curriculum and Pedagogy, Ph.D History and Security Studies), is Ag. Dean, Faculty of Education, Sokoto State University
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