Catergorising these guys is a tough task. It’s tough categorising all the actors in the conflicts in the Middle East, anyway. This can happen wherever non-state actors are more than state actors. The Kurds belong to the former, and I pick them first from a host of others. Yet, this description of Kurds doesn’t tell who they are exactly. For instance, Kurds of Iraq are almost state actors, but Kurds of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Armenia are non-state actors. Wherever they’re found, Kurds are a force to reckon with in any matter, including the violent conflicts that ravage the Middle East at the moment. Along with Arabs, Azeris, Persians, Egyptians and Turks, they make up the largest ethnic groups in the region. Kurds are the 12th entity in the series in which I look at the role each actor plays in the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.
The 25 to 35 million Kurds in the Middle East may have diverse problems with the states in which they’re located, but generally they remain a factor in the region. Players from here or from outside that overlook them do so at their own risk. So Western governments factor Kurds into their plans, and Middle East nations where they’re located in significant numbers find Kurds to be quite handful. Kurds can make or break any process here. I reckon this is because they’re a determined and focused people, an exceptional lot. I take note of exceptional humans; those who push walls, people who don’t think anything is impossible however long it takes. Kurds are brave, they’re courageous, disciplined like soldier ants, and they are fine warriors. The West admires them for these. In the pre-1918 period, Kurds had been under the Ottoman Empire. They did have an understanding with western governments that they would have their own state after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, so they had fought for the Western Allies against the Ottomans in the WW1. Other states were created out of the collapsed Ottoman Empire, but there wasn’t a Kurdistan.
In the decades that follow, Kurds desire to have their own state. In the process, they’ve had volatile relations with the government of each of the nations where they find themselves. Turkey is one of such.
Kurds are represented in the government in Ankara, while they equally canvass greater autonomy, and sometimes independence. Violent encounters with the government had been many over the decades.
Insurrections were brutally crushed though each time it happened. In diverse ways, Kurds made Turkish government realise they wouldn’t be crushed. Kurds’ armed wing in Turkey, the PKK, has used armed attacks in its demand for autonomy in Kurds’ homeland. The Turkish government responds in kind; its defence budgets factor in the PKK, creating such a huge financial burden that Ankara is pressured into holding peace talks with the Kurds. These talks have faltered and the Turkish government now uses every reason to go after the PKK, Kurds’ political wing and their sympathisers, with the excuse of rounding up those involved in the July 2016 military coup.
The role of Kurds in the Middle East can’t in any way be fully apparent in Turkey. Their role in Iraq demonstrates this better. A Kurdistan exists here, in Iraq’s northern parts. As a result of several factors, including lack of control by the central government in many parts of the country, Kurdish leaders have tactically grabbed from Baghdad much of the symbolisms of an independent country for Kurdistan, using these to improve the well-being of their people. Now, this autonomous area only waits for Baghdad to organise a referendum to determine Kurdistan’s independence; this is the outcome of a negotiated agreement following years of repression under a former president, Saddam Hussein. Meanwhile, Kurdistan maintains an army and it sells crude oil from its oil-rich fields to international buyers, making use of the fund as it wishes. In the ongoing fight with ISIS in Iraq, Kurdistan’s army has proved useful both to Baghdad and the western coalition.
The Kurds of Syria mostly inhabit a region on the northern end of the country. This area is contiguous with the south-eastern ends of Turkey that Turkey’s Kurds consider their homeland. Kurds’ actions on both sides of the Turkish-Syrian border have influenced how Turkey conducts itself with respect to the conflict in Iraq as well as in Syria.
Kurds’ independent actions influence Turkey’s overall strategic calculations here. They also inform the calculations of the United States of America in the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts. Historically, the West has excellent relations with Kurds. When ISIS invaded Iraq, Kurdistan in Iraq had its army take on the Jihadists after the Iraqi army had fled. Western coalition that wanted to stop ISIS didn’t want to fight on ground, so it provided air cover for Kurds. This has proved effective in halting and rolling back ISIS in many parts of Iraq and Syria. From this perspective, it’s easier to see how Kurds play a role of regional proportion.
The Kurds of Syria aren’t left out in this. When ISIS moved into Syria and made efforts to capture Kurdish areas, it met with solid resistance at a time the Syrian army found it difficult to push back ISIS, a time the Russians hadn’t arrived to assist Damascus. For instance, late in 2014, ISIS had moved into a town around the Syrian border with Turkey; this forced thousands of people to cross the border into Turkey, creating a humanitarian problem for the Turks.
Ankara allowed Kurdish fighters to combat ISIS for Kobane one month later; this was after the US-led air strikes had halted ISIS. Kurdish forces took back Kobane early 2015, and from that point onward they had defeated ISIS in several battles in northern Syria. Now, these warriors control over 400kms of Syrian territory close to the border with Turkey and hold some 50Kms even in known ISIS strongholds. Kurds in Syria provide the most effective ground force and have proved to be the best allies of western coalition in the effort to remove ISIS from Syria.
Kurds in Iran, some 10 per cent of the population, have their Kurdistan on Iran’s northwestern flank. Iranian Kurdistan is one of the four parts of a greater Kurdistan that includes parts of southeastern Turkey, northern Syria, and northern Iraq. It seems Kurds in Iran are silent compared to those of Turkey, Iraq and Syria. This isn’t exactly so.
There’s a Kurdish-Iranian conflict, an ongoing rebellion and separatist tendency often fuelled by the move towards independence achieved already by Kurds in Iraq. A rebellion by an Iranian Kurdish group, PJAK, has continued since 2004. The group says it wants human rights for Kurds and more autonomy for the region that Kurds populate.
The government however says the PJAK is a separatist body and an enemy of Iran, even as the PJAK insists its demands pose no threat to the state.
Armenia isn’t exactly in the Middle East so I leave the Kurds of Armenia out of this piece. It’s enough to state however that Kurds of
Armenia share the greater autonomy outlook that Kurds in other nations have. There’s no ruling out eventual independence for a Kurdistan in each of the nations where Kurds dwell. It’s their ultimate objective, although the path to independence is fraught with obstacles. But I notice something in the manner Kurds involve themselves in the conflicts in the Middle East, as well as how they play their cards with respect to the matter of eventual independence. They’ve used a forceful approach from the 1920s that doesn’t work. What has followed is what I read as the strategic toning down of their ultimate demand.
Punch
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