It is entirely reasonable to interpose the query as to the proper rationale for private military contractors in sovereign states. That quandary is strikingly pertinent where a sovereign nation possesses, and retains the deterrent capacity to deploy as necessary, effective, nimble, ditto proactive, military assets in order to protect lives and property on the domestic turf, whilst projecting, and safeguarding, strategic interests in the foreign sphere. Military assets within this purview, encompass the air force, army, air force, navy, police, internal security and “special operations” apparatchiks operating territorially and extra-territorially.
The answer to that poser is not unfathomable given the operative rider: “effective, nimble and proactive military assets in order to protect lives and property…” How many sovereign states possess this “effectiveness” capacity? And even if they did possess it, does the strategic interest of sovereign state A, for instance, justify using its own regular forces to execute, say, mission X, which breaches international law on the territorial integrity of another independent state, B? In other words, A, may decide that it is justifiable realpolitik to use a proxy to accomplish mission X. In that scenario, the proxy is a military contractor, which by extension, highlights the concept of plausible deniability.
This rather shifty concept may enable A, to deflect responsibility from its unlawful actions as there is unlikely to be a direct evidential chain of causation between A, and mission X, in state B, given the intermediation of a known or shadowy private military contractor.
In conflict zones, Private Military Contractors (PMCs) may be used to bolster the fighting capabilities of opposing sides to secure “victory” however they define same. Here, the PMCs are purely mercenaries or soldiers of fortune who fight purely for money devoid of ethical considerations. That’s the narrow deployment of the term. In a wider sense, private military contractors may constitute an integral component of a sovereign state’s defence architecture, especially in furtherance of foreign policy and geostrategic interests.
That said, is it inexorably true that a sovereign state’s geostrategic interests and those of a private military contractor converge? What is the strategic corollary of a divergence? Afterall, regular security forces typically pledge, and honour, oaths of allegiance to the integrity and well-being of sovereign states. However, private military contractors, as the name clearly depicts, are profit-driven and not necessarily inspired by patriotic fervour.
Logically therefore, there is an inherent foundational ideological conflict between the parties. The poser then emerges as to how much of a conflict exists between established security forces and private military contractors and whether it is open to blackmail? If so, how are those critical risks mitigated?
Wagner Group PMC, the Russian paramilitary outfit founded in 2014 affords interesting insights. According to the US Army’s West Point CTC Sentinel (June 2022, Volume 15, Issue 6), the Wagner Group featured prominently in the Donbas conflict against Ukraine through 2014 and 2015. Equally, Wagner PMC has been active in war zones across the world notably, in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Sudan and Syria.
Unsurprisingly advancing Russian interests, the Group was active in the Russian/Ukrainian conflict which began on February 24, 2022 until June 2023; when Wagner’s dynamic relationship with Russia was, perhaps irredeemably, fractured over the PMC’s armed rebellion against the Russian state!
That rebellion falls outside the purview of this piece. However, the material points to note are: One, the Wagner Group was created to advance Russia’s geostrategic interests. Two, it provided a proxy and plausible deniability for Russia’s actions in specific conflicts on foreign soil. Three, it harmonises Russia’s strategic aspiration as a global counterbalance to perceived or real American domination in global affairs. This proposition is corroborated, in part, by Russia’s Deputy Head of Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, who stated inter alia, on July 3, 2023, that Russia’s goal in the conflict with Ukraine is “to eliminate the threat of Ukraine’s membership in NATO. And we will achieve it one way or the other” (Reuters). Four, there was a striking geostrategic divergence of interests between Russia and Wagner PMC when the latter launched an armed rebellion against Russia, effectively blackmailing the country. And five, the executed risk mitigation plan pursuant to the rebellion was the exile of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozin, to Belarus.
Across the Atlantic, the American PMC, Blackwater (having undergone several reconfigurations and since reincarnated as Constellis Holdings), provides another interesting case study. The PMC was established in 1996 and provides extensive security services to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other emanations of the United States’ government. Pursuant to America’s legally contested invasion of Iraq in 2003, some of Blackwater PMC’s personnel were directly implicated in the killing of 17 innocent Iraqis and causing injury to 20 innocent civilians at Nisour Square, Baghdad.
Although four of the PMC’s personnel were convicted in the United States courts, they were to be controversially pardoned by ex US President Trump, on December 22, 2020. The decision was condemned around the world and Jelena Aparac, then head of the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries publicly affirmed that: “the Geneva Conventions oblige states to hold war criminals accountable for their crimes, even when they act as private security contractors…these pardons violate US obligations under international law and more broadly undermine humanitarian law and human rights at a global level. Ensuring accountability for such crimes is fundamental to humanity and to the community of nations”
The firm continues to provide PMC services to the US government and, in an earlier corporate configuration, earned circa $92 million for security services for the American State Department barely a decade ago. Again, just like Russia’s Wagner Group is projecting Russian interests, Blackwater was, advancing American foreign policy and geostrategic interests at the material time. There was no direct chain of causation between Blackwater and US regular forces on the particular facts. Ergo, there was no question of the US government being vicariously liable for Blackwater’s actions at the time even though the contractor was evidently a US proxy. Plus, there was a sharp divergence of strategic interests between both parties on the facts evidenced, in part, by the murder convictions secured against Blackwater’s personnel at the time. Because, no civilized government in the world would authorise the slaughter of innocent people.
The third illustrative case study is Nigeria where PMCs complement the efforts of the country’s security services. Despite the gallant efforts of the country’s security forces, insecurity, kidnapping, ethno-religious terrorism plagues the nation with a population of approximately 222.182 million (International Monetary Fund). The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect established that over 35,000 persons have been killed since 2009 pursuant to Boko haram related terrorist activities for instance. Moreso, the Nigerian military comprises approximately 223,000 personnel. That is one military personnel to circa 10,000 people. Reinforcing this, the former Defence Minister, General Bashir Magaji (Rtd), opined that the country’s armed forces are overstretched because of insufficient manpower and existential security challenges (25th Edition PMB Scorecard Series, 2023).
These volatilities are further exacerbated by significant socio-economic challenges. According to the Nigerian Economic Summit Group’s 2023 Macroeconomic Outlook, “Nigeria in Transition: Recipes for Shared Prosperity”, unemployment is forecast to hit 37% whilst the poverty headcount will increase to 45%. These pernicious dynamics imperil the capacity of the security services to execute the letter and spirit of the provisions of section 14 (1) (b) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended from time to time) viz: “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”; and section 217 (a), (b), (c), and (d) therein which establish the functions of the military as defending Nigeria from external aggression; maintaining its territorial integrity; suppressing insurrection in aid of civil authorities and other functions prescribed by the National Assembly.
The inference here is that the constrained capacity of the security services, in its widest sense, informs the logic of the country’s private military contractors. Examples of existing PMCs are Global West, Ocean Marine Solutions, and Labrador Security Outfit etc. And in August 2022, Nigerian government awarded multi-billion-naira oil pipeline surveillance and protection contracts to indigenous PMCs.
To conclude, private military security firms around the world subsist partly to fulfil “unmet security needs”, complement the services of regular forces in sovereign states, and or act as proxies for nations to execute their geostrategic national interests either within the domestic or foreign spheres. Their opaque modus operandi affords sponsoring sovereign states the defence of plausible deniability in those instances where the PMCs violate international law, which, by the way, is not the exception. And the thorny subject of the divergence of strategic interests of sovereign states and private military contractors is not about to be resolved in short order.
The reason is simple: states will be extremely cautious about playing fast and loose with a rules-based international legal orthodoxy and will not necessarily be driven by bald profit motives to accomplish key strategic intentions. Conversely, PMCs are fundamentally about profit, like any commercial enterprise. They are not charitable organisations! An international legal regimen will not necessarily constrain strategic and operational manoeuvres by PMCs. The reason is simple: securing competitive advantage and safeguarding national interests, at times by unorthodox means, underpins lingering contestable power dynamics on the global stage.
Ojumu is the Principal Partner at Balliol Myers LP, a firm of legal practitioners and strategy consultants in Lagos, Nigeria.
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