In view of last week’s routing of the Nigerian Army camp at Metele in Borno State by the Boko Haram faction of the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA), which purportedly led to the killing of about 100 soldiers, I wish to present snippets from my recently released book, Boko Haram and Armed Herdsmen Violence: The Theory and Politics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, taking a general view of the military’s action against the terrorists under President Muhammadu Buhari:
“By April 8, 2015 when West African leaders met to review their strategy so far, the results of the Nigerian polls were already known but by convention, President Jonathan was to remain in power until May 29, 2015. Meanwhile, the offensive continued with a purposeful push into Sambisa beginning from April 22, and, as the troops made advance they met and freed hundreds of prisoners and liberated many Boko Haram camps along the way. However, deep penetration into the forest was hampered by mines planted by the [retreading] terrorists.
[But], as President Jonathan prepared to leave office, Boko Haram once more was beginning to show signs of resilience; it started recapturing lost territories. The assault on Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri during this interregnum was a symbolic message by the terrorist group to announce that it was alive and kicking. On May 15, 2015 it recaptured the strategic border town of Marte once again…
Enter President Buhari and the second phase of the war against Boko Haram: June 2015 till the present. It would be wrong to suggest that there was any basic break in the military strategy adopted by the incoming President from May 29, when he took power from President Jonathan. However, his style was remarkably different.
From the start, he ordered the Chief of Army Staff and all the military top brass in charge of the war to relocate to Maiduguri, the theatre of operations, for an on-ground supervision. This was a departure from the immediate past when the top brass lived in Abuja, feeding fat on defence allocations without actually feeling the pulse of the war.
President Jonathan’s Generals were not only out of touch with the troops on ground who always complained of unpaid salaries and allowances, poor feeding, inadequate logistics and inferior weaponry but were also, apparently, profiteering directly from the war itself…
Thus, President Buhari’s marching orders didn’t only resonate with the rank and file of the armed forces but also the public. So much so that even though his counterinsurgency strategy was essentially more of the same medicine, it was more inspiring especially to Nigeria’s partners within the MNJTF as well as the international community.
His offensive strategy was two-pronged: to retake the towns that have fallen into the militants’ hands and to totally capture Sambisa Forest.
Using mine sweepers, the army moved with the support of the Air Force for a total onslaught on Sambisa. The NAF used a combination of F7 and Alpha jets for supersonic attacks, Mi35 helicopter gunships as well as Super Puma attack helicopters and MI 24 patrol aircraft. By September 2015, the Director of Information, Defence Headquarters, announced that all Boko Haram’s camps in the Sambisa forest had been captured and destroyed.
On December 24, 2015 President Buhari announced the “technical defeat” of Boko Haram. Speaking with the BBC, the President said the group could no longer engage in “conventional attacks” against security forces or population centres.
Almost a year later, while briefing newsmen, Major General Leo Irabor, the Theatre Commander Operation Lafia Dole, said as a result of an offensive launched on December 22, 2016, the last stronghold of Boko Haram, Camp Zairo (Zero?), deep inside Sambisa Forest, had been cleared. But more than a year later, on February 4, 2018, Major General Rogers Nicholas, the then Theatre Commander, said as the result of Operation Deep Punch II launched by his troop on the 2nd February, they have “dislodged and occupied the insurgents’ tactical ground “Camp Zairo.”
But these back and forth tales of defeat and victory are confusing to the public. In an editorial opinion published on February 8, 2018, the Vanguard newspaper asked: “How many times shall we defeat Boko Haram?”
Agreed, significant headway was made in the military action against the terrorist insurgency but a decisive victory, especially weighed against the decapitation policy of the Army, was not achieved. In the aftermath, Boko Haram immediately switched to its earlier guerilla warfare, relying mostly on suicide bombing and the occasional ambush on military positions. And, yet, exactly two weeks after General Nicholas’ boast, Boko Haram, abducted 110 schoolgirls at the Government Girls Science and Technical College (GGSTC) in Dapchi, Yobe State.
The major failure of the counter-terrorism approach under President Buhari was still the failure of the military to hold and secure liberated territories. Efforts are dissipated on what the US Bureau of Counter-terrorism in its 2016 Country Report referred to as “merely duplication of failed efforts,” a tendency, which the Chadian President Deby had earlier criticised, resulting in towns being retaken more than once because they were poorly secured…
In January 2018, the National Population Commission reported that the number of displaced people in Nigeria increased by 4.5%…NPC Chairman, Mr. Eze Duruiheoma, said that the NPC had identified an estimated 1.7 million IDPs in over 321,580 households across six states of North East Nigeria with 40% residing in camp-like settings in January. He said that this was a jump of 4-5% increase over the figures for December 2017…
Going by this figure, it can be concluded that neither the military action against Boko Haram, nor the rehabilitation of the displaced, anywhere close to success. In fact, as at mid-2018 the Nigerian media was [saturated] with stories about mounting casualty rates suffered by Nigerian troops which the Nigerian authorities were reluctant in admitting. The only hint that the government was indeed troubled came after a meeting between the President and all security chiefs in August 2018.”
Now we are three months to another election, and similar complains about inferior weapons and inadequate logistics are rife. Reports say the slain Commander at Metele had earlier been threatened with court martial because he expressed strong reservation about the troops’ movement on account of poor logistics.
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