As the US President Joe Biden seeks a review of the Taiwan policy, he is being advised by a top American think tank to ensure that in case of China deciding to use force to unify Taiwan with the mainland, America should “continue to stand by Taiwan to support a fellow democracy and to maintain US credibility and influence in the Indo-Pacific”.
The advice is contained in the February 2021 report of the Rand Corporation, titled, “US Allied and Partner Support for Taiwan: Responses to a Chinese Attack on Taiwan and Potential US Taiwan policy Changes”. The report is the deposition of the Corporation’s expert, Bonny Lin, before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
The report says: “If China attacks Taiwan, there is regional expectation that the United States would defend Taiwan even though the United States does not have a treaty obligation to do so. US inaction would have larger consequences beyond Taiwan and could negatively affect assessments of US commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, willingness to counter Chinese aggression, and willingness to defend regional allies and partners”.
The Rand report is asking the Biden administration to pursue a policy wherein the US is not the aggressor, but will act in the interests of Taiwan if the latter is militarily threatened by China. “The United States should not take any step to clarify its Taiwan policy without first consulting and coordinating with Taiwan….(needs) clearer understanding…between the United States and Taiwan on what Taipei needs to do for its defense….asking Taiwan to spend more on defense via smart investments, increasing US consultations with Taiwan to ensure that increased expenditures are effective and in line with the stated goals of Taiwan’s “Overall Defense Concept”, or (as in the case of prior administrations) asking the island to refrain from certain types of activities that may unnecessarily provoke China”.
So far, the strongest deterrence to China on the Taiwan issue has been the Taiwan Relations Act enacted by the US in 1979 to define the non-diplomatic relations between the US and Taiwan. It is no guarantee that the US will intervene militarily if China attacks Taiwan. The consent of the US Congress is required for that
The US policy on Taiwan is called “strategic ambiguity” – it means the question of American intervention will remain ambiguous. The TRA, however, permits the US to use embargoes and boycotts to counter any threat to the Western Pacific area, provide weapons of a “defensive character” to Taiwan, allow US “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion”.
The key to any assessment about China and Taiwan is the role of the United States. Will it continue its current policy of “strategic ambiguity” under the TRA or “increase support for Taiwan by publicly clarifying U.S. commitments to Taiwan some high-ranking former officials have recently argued in favor of”. Such an increase could be in the form of “issuing a public statement, upgrading the US-Taiwan relationship or diplomatically recognizing Taiwan, revising the TRA, or signing a new document or mutual defense treaty with Taiwan”.
Evaluating both the possibilities, the report says the very fact that China, not really knowing if US will intervene militarily thanks to its “strategic ambiguity” policy, has shored up its military capabilities in case the US intervention happens. The report says: “In other words, the current US Taiwan policy of strategic ambiguity is probably already playing as large a role as it can in deterring China from attacking Taiwan. Publicly strengthening and clarifying the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would likely only reinforce Chinese planning for U.S. intervention and could strengthen Chinese incentives to strike first against the United States or potential coalition members in a potential Taiwan contingency. An increased US commitment to defend Taiwan does not shield Taiwan from elevated Chinese coercion”.
The Rand report asks the US administration to also consider the big picture before reviewing the Taiwan policy: “Given the importance of Taiwan to China, publicly clarifying the US position on Taiwan also risks undermining the overall US-China relationship. The United States still seeks to work with China on a variety of issues in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. US leaders would need to weigh the marginal benefits of a clearer security guarantee to Taiwan versus the loss in Chinese cooperation (and potential rise in Chinese obstruction) internationally”.
Should the President review the Taiwan policy it would mean taking a re-look at the TRA as well. The report points out that any move by the US “to clarify its relationship with or commitments to Taiwan should involve a comprehensive weighing of the potential costs and benefits to Taiwan and to larger US regional and global interests”.
Should Biden also decide to shift the Taiwan policy away from “strategic ambiguity”, the report suggests “embracing lower-key options that do not involve discarding the US One-China Policy or revising the TRA are likely to lead to a lower risk of cross-Strait and U.S.-China tensions”. However it cautions that “if the United States decides to publicly clarify its Taiwan policy, it may want to do so after Taiwan has taken more steps to strengthen its resilience against Chinese military pressure and potential Chinese political and economic coercion”.
The Rand report lists the factors that might influence how allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific might respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan:
“The nature of action taken by China and Taiwan’s response; the importance of Taiwan to the ally or partner, particularly compared with China; the potential for Chinese retaliation and growing Chinese power; the ally or partner’s relationship with the US and what the latter can provide; any potential ally or partner’s domestic, legal, foreign policy, or other constraints on use of force or involvement in military conflicts”.
It says “Japan and Australia rank as the two countries most likely to assist the United States militarily in the defense of Taiwan, likely allowing the United States to conduct operations from military bases on their territories and potentially contributing their own troops to the fight”. According to the report, “India, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam fall into the more uncertain category” and they may try “to stay neutral or provide limited, less conspicuous forms of assistance, such as intelligence-sharing, support for limited humanitarian military operations (such as non-combatant evacuation operations), or logistics support”.
The Rand report expands its speculation to assess what happens if China goes ballistic during its attack. It makes an interesting assessment: “China, for example, could seek to deter or cripple large-scale U.S. and allied intervention by striking early at U.S. or allied military bases. China could also seek to launch attacks on the United States, Taiwan, or coalition members from assets based on disputed South China Sea (SCS) territories and expand Beijing’s control of the SCS. Such an expansion of activities in the SCS could draw such countries as Vietnam and the Philippines into the conflict”.
The report makes it clear that China will not leave the Taiwan issue at any cost. “Even if the United States and allies were able to successfully counter an initial PRC attack on Taiwan and deny China from achieving its immediate objectives, Beijing could still remain committed to unification with Taiwan. China could wage a protracted conflict over Taiwan that would challenge and impose significant costs to countries defending the island”.
The report attempts to understand how the allies and partners will shape their responses if China attacks Taiwan. It also provides a caveat: “If the United States does not take action to assist Taiwan, it is unlikely that other regional countries would be willing to do so and bear the brunt of potential Chinese retaliation without U.S. support.”
The factors are: One, the twin facts that they do not have official relations with Taiwan and that China views Taiwan as a “national interest” will “contribute to more caution in regional deliberations to assist Taiwan”.
Two, “the cause of the Chinese attack on Taiwan” will largely shape regional and international responses. “Who is seen as being at fault and how aggressive China has been in the Indo-Pacific region at large are likely to influence whether allies and partners are willing to support Taiwan.”
Three, “the scale and damage of the Chinese attack” is also a determining factor. The report explains: “A massive Chinese military attack on Taiwan resulting in significant casualties…could generate more regional willingness to assist Taiwan, particularly if significant numbers of allied and partner citizens are killed in such an attack: The Philippines and Vietnam, for example, are two of the countries with the most citizens in Taiwan, and each have over 100,000 citizens working or studying on the island”.
Four, “how Taiwan responds to the Chinese attack” is also a factor. “Allies and partners may be more inclined to come to Taiwan’s defense if the island’s response is limited to countering the assaulting People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces, compared to Taiwan engaging in some type of counter value retaliation (such as striking Chinese cities) that results in significant Chinese civilian deaths that could cause Beijing to further escalate its use of force”.
Clearly, the report takes into account the fact that if an attack occurs it will in no time widen and escalate the conflict and “regional countries could become involved if their territories (or claimed territories) are attacked by China or used by China to attack Taiwan”.
The report ponders whether regional countries with territorial disputes with China — India, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam – will think that if Taiwan is taken by force, China can then turn its attention to settle other disputes as well. It answers its own question: “It is unlikely, however, that this consideration by itself is sufficient to encourage regional allies and partners to militarily assist Taiwan, particularly given the potential for Chinese retaliation.”
Dr Williams is an expert on foreign affairs based Uyo, Akwa Ibom
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